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Abstract. With Attribute-based Signatures (ABS) users can simulta-
neously sign messages and prove compliance of their attributes, issued by
designated attribute authorities, with some verification policy. Neither
signer’s identity nor possessed attributes are leaked during the verifica-
tion process, making ABS schemes a handy tool for applications requiring
privacy-preserving authentication. Earlier ABS schemes lacked support
for hierarchical delegation of attributes (across tiers of attribute author-
ities down to the signers), a distinct property that has made traditional
PKIs more scalable and widely adoptable.
This changed recently with the introduction of Hierarchical ABS (HABS)
schemes, where support for attribute delegation was proposed in combi-
nation with stronger privacy guarantees for the delegation paths (path
anonymity) and new accountability mechanisms allowing a dedicated
tracing authority to identify these paths (path traceability) and the
signer, along with delegated attributes, if needed. Yet, current HABS
construction is generic with inefficient delegation process resulting in
sub-optimal signature lengths of order O(k2|Ψ |) where Ψ is the policy
size and k the height of the hierarchy.
This paper proposes a direct HABS construction in bilinear groups that
significantly improves on these bounds and satisfies the original security
and privacy requirements. At the core of our HABS scheme is a new
delegation process based on the length-reducing homomorphic trapdoor
commitments to group elements for which we introduce a new delega-
tion technique allowing step-wise commitments to additional elements
without changing the length of the original commitment and its open-
ing. While also being of independent interest, this technique results in
shorter HABS keys and achieves the signature-length growth of O(k|Ψ |)
which is optimal due to the path-traceability requirement.
1 Introduction
Attribute-based Signatures, first introduced in [30] and [31], provide privacy-
preserving mechanisms for authenticating messages. An ABS signature assures
the verifier that the signer owns a set of attributes that satisfy the signing policy
without leaking their identity, nor the set of attributes used. Traditional ABS
schemes considered two security properties, user privacy and unforgeability. In-
formally, a user is anonymous if an ABS signature does not leak their identity,
nor the set of attributes used to satisfy the signing policy, while unforgeability
requires that a signer cannot produce a signature conforming to a policy for
which he does not own a set of suitable attributes. Later constructions [16, 14,
20] offered more advanced functionality with an additional property of traceabil-
ity which holds signers accountable by allowing a dedicated tracing authority to
identity them if required.
The vast majority of existing ABS schemes [16, 33, 32, 5, 14, 20, 13, 35]are non-
interactive, in the standard model and is based on bilinear maps and Groth-Sahai
proofs [21], with the exception of [23], which uses RSA setting and the random
oracle model, and the recent schemes in [15, 38] which rely on lattices. Interac-
tive ABS schemes, e.g. [27], where policies must be chosen by verifiers ahead
of the signing phase have also been proposed. In general, signing polices can
have varying levels of flexibility and range from threshold policies [30], to mono-
tone boolean predicates [14, 20], and generalised circuits [35]. Typically, more
restrictive policies allow for more efficient constructions. Policy-based Signa-
tures (PBS) [5] can be viewed as a generalisation of ABS schemes, albeit their
security is currently proven in a single-user setting without addressing stronger
non-frameability requirement of more recent ABS schemes [14, 20, 12].
Hierarchical Attribute-based Signature and their Limitations. Hierar-
chical Attribute-based Signatures (HABS), recently introduced in [12], extend
traditional ABS schemes by permitting controlled delegation of attributes from a
root authority (RA) over possibly multiple intermediate authorities (IAs) down
to the users. In this way HABS aims to close the gap between ABS and tradi-
tional PKIs where hierarchical delegation can be achieved at low cost. In HABS,
IAs can delegate attributes to any authority in the scheme and users can ac-
quire attributes from any authority in the hierarchy that is authorised to issue
them. In addition to strong non-frameability property in a multi-user setting,
the authors extend traditional ABS privacy guarantees to protect not only the
identity of the signer but also the identities of all intermediate authorities in
the delegation path, as part of their new path-anonymity property. Traditional
traceability property of ABS schemes has also been extended to hold not only
signers but also intermediate authorities accountable for their actions, through
the new notion of path-traceability where a dedicated tracing authority can re-
veal the entire delegation path, along with delegated attributes.
We observe that the HABS scheme in [12] is generic, based on standard cryp-
tographic primitives, i.e., public key encryption, one-time signature, tag-based
signature, and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Its delegation process is
handled using a tag-based signature (TBS) where an authority at level i pro-
duces a TBS signature, using attribute as a tag, on the public key of authority
j together with all public keys appearing previously in the delegation path. As
part of its HABS signature the signer proves knowledge of each TBS at every
delegation of each attribute that is required to satisfy the policy. Clearly this del-
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egation process is highly inefficient. Not only does an additional signature need
to be verified per delegation (and per attribute), the size of the signature grows
linearly in the distance from the root authority. Thus, per attribute, verification
of the delegation path is of order O(k2).
Other related work. Attribute-based signatures can be seen as a generalisa-
tion of group [11] and ring [34] signatures, in which case identities are viewed
as attributes and policies can only contain disjunction over them. The notion of
hierarchical delegation in these, more restricted, primitives have been explored
in [37] and [29] respectively. Attribute delegation has been widely investigated
in anonymous credentials [9, 10]. Maji et al. [31] give discussion that ACs are a
more powerful primitive than ABS but with effiency drawbacks, as attribute ac-
quisition typically requires expensive zero-knowledge proofs. Note that in HABS
intermediate authorities may know each other, and so as discussed in [12], there
is no need to hide their identities from each other during the delegation phase,
which in turn helps to omit costly proofs and make this phase more efficient than
in the case of ACs. Regardless, we note that ACs with hierarchical delegation
have been proposed [4]. Further, a homomorphic ABS scheme [25] has been used
to construct non-delegatable anonymous credentials. In this setting, a signer ob-
tains attributes directly from the (multiple) root authorities where combining
attributes from different issuers requires an online collaboration. Anonymous
Proxy Signatures [17] also allow for verification of anonymous delegation paths
back to a root authority. However, tasks that are delegated, when viewed as
attributes, remain in the clear and are required for verification of the proxy
signature. Homomorphic Signatures [38] have been claimed to be equivalent to
Attribute-based Signatures, however this equality has been shown to hold in
the weaker security setting that only considers a solitary user. In which, it is
impossible to capture the notion of collusion and non-frameability. Finally, we
note functional signatures [3, 8] also allow for delegation of signing rights. Here,
however, keys are dependent on the function f and can only sign on messages
that fall within the range. For an attribute-based scheme, this would require
keys for each possible combination of attributes a user obtains.
Contribution. We address the suboptimal efficiency of the so-far only (generic)
HABS construction [12] and propose a scheme with a completely new delegation
mechanism which no longer relies on the consecutive issue of tag-based signa-
tures from higher-level to lower-level authorities on the delegation path. The
main novelty in our approach is a smart use of the length-reducing homomor-
phic trapdoor commitment scheme to multiple group elements from [21] which
we extend with delegation capabilities. At a high level, at each delegation the
issuing intermediate authority amends the current trapdoor opening such that
the existing commitment incorporates the public key of the next-level authority
or user to whom the attribute is delegated. With this new delegation mechanism
we are able to significantly reduce the lengths of HABS keys and achieve the
optimal growth of O(k|Ψ |) for the length of HABS signatures, depending on the
length k of the delegation path and size |Ψ | of the signing policy. In particular,
verifying delegation of an attribute along the path takes O(k) steps (as opposed
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to O(k2) in [12]). We use the original security model from [12] to show that our
construction satisfies the required properties of path anonymity, path traceabil-
ity, and non-frameability, in the standard model under standard assumptions in
bilinear groups and an additional assumption which we justify using the generic
group model [36]. Our efficiency improvement claims over [12] are reinforced in
a detailed comparison between the two schemes.
2 HABS Model: Entities and Definitions
We start with the description of entities within the HABS ecosystem.
Attribute Authorities. The set of Attribute Authorities (AA) comprises the
Root Authority (RA) and Intermediate Authorities (IAs). All AAs can delegate
attributes to lower-level IAs and users. The RA is at the top of the hierarchy and
upon setup, defines the universe of attributes A. With its key pair (ask0, apk0),
the RA can delegate a subset of attributes to IAs which hold their own key
pairs (aski, apki), i > 0. IAs can further delegate/issue attributes to any end
user (aka. signer). In this way a dynamically expandable HABS hierarchy can
be established.
Users. Users join the scheme by creating their own key pair (usk, upk), and are
issued attributes by possibly multiple AAs.
By Ψ we denote a predicate for some signing policy. A policy-conforming user
can use usk to create a HABS signature, provided their issued set of attributes A
satisfies the policy, i.e. Ψ(A′) = 1 for some A′ ⊆ A. Users are unable to delegate
attributes further and thus can be viewed as the lowest tier of the hierarchy. To
account for this, when an attribute is delegated to a user a dedicated symbol ?
will be used in addition to upk to mark the end of the delegation path.
Warrants. An IA or user, upon joining the HABS scheme, receives a warrant
warr that consists of all their delegated attributes a ∈ A and a list of all AAs
in each of the delegation paths. Warrants can be updated at any time, i.e. if
the owner is issued a new attribute, by appending a new entry with the list of
authorities on the delegation path. We use the notation |warr| to denote the
size of the warrant, i.e. the number of attributes stored in the warrant warr,
and we use |warr[a]| to denote the length of the delegation path of the attribute
a ∈ A. Upon signing, the user submits a reduced warrant for an attribute set
A′ ⊆ A that satisfies Ψ(A′) = 1.
Tracing Authority. The tracing authority (TA) is independent of the hierar-
chy. Upon receiving a valid HABS signature, it can identify the signer and all
authorities on the delegation paths for attributes that the signer used to satisfy
the signing policy. The tracing authority can output a publicly verifiable proof
pˆi that the path was identified correctly. The existence of such tracing authority
improves the accountability of signers and IAs from possible misbehaviour.
Definition 1 (Hierarchical ABS Scheme [12]) A scheme HABS := (Setup,
KGen, AttIssue, Sign, Verify, Trace, Judge) consists of the following seven pro-
cesses:
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• Setup(1λ) is the initialisation process where based on some security param-
eter λ ∈ N, the public parameters pp of the scheme are defined, and the root
and tracing authority independently generate their own key pair, i.e. RA’s
(ask0, apk0) and TA’s (tsk, tpk). In addition, RA defines the universe A of
attributes, and a label ? for users. We stress that due to dynamic hierar-
chy, the system can be initialised by publishing ( pp, apk0, tpk) with A and ?
contained in pp.
• KGen(pp) is a key generation algorithm executed independently by interme-
diate authorities and users. Each entity generates its own key pair, i.e.,
(aski, apki) for i > 0 or (usk, upk).
• AttIssue (aski,warri, A, {apkj |upkj}) is an algorithm that is used to dele-
gate attributes to an authority with apkj or issue them to the user with upk.
On input of an authority’s secret key aski, i ∈ N0, its warrant warri, a
subset of attributes A from warri, and the public key of the entity to which
attributes are delegated or issued, it outputs a new warrant for that entity.
• Sign ((usk,warr),m, Ψ) is the signing algorithm. On input of the signer’s
usk and (possibly reduced) warr, a message m and a predicate Ψ it outputs
a signature σ.
• Verify (apk0, (m, Ψ, σ)) is a deterministic algorithm that outputs 1 if a can-
didate signature σon a message m is valid with respect to the predicate Ψ
and 0 otherwise.
• Trace (tsk, apk0, (m, Ψ, σ)) is an algorithm executed by the TA on input of
its private key tsk and outputs either a triple (upk,warr, pˆi) if the tracing
is successful or ⊥ to indicate its failure. Note that warr contains attributes
and delegation paths that were used by the signer.
• Judge (tpk, apk0, (m, Ψ, σ), (upk,warr, pˆi)) is a deterministic algorithm that
checks a candidate triple (upk,warr, pˆi) from the tracing algorithm and out-
puts 1 if the triple is valid and 0 otherwise.
A HABS scheme must have the correctness property ensuring that any signature
σ generated based on an honestly issued warrant will verify and trace correctly.
The output (upk,warr, pˆi) of the tracing algorithm on such signatures will be
accepted by the public judging algorithm with overwhelming probability.
2.1 Security Properties
Our security definitions resemble the requirements of path anonymity, path trace-
ability, and non-frameability from [12]. We recall the associated game-based def-
initions assuming probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversaries interacting
with HABS entities through the following set of oracles:
– OReg : A registers new IAs and users through this registration oracle, for
which a key pair will be generated and added to List. The public key is
given to the adversary. Initially, the entity is considered honest, and so the
public key is also added to the list HU .
– OCorr : This oracle allows A to corrupt registered users or IAs. Upon input
of a public key, the corresponding private key is given as output if it exists
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OReg( · ) with ( · ) = ( i ) and i /∈ HU
1 : (ski, pki)← KGen(pp)
2 : List← List ∪ {(i, pki, ski)}
3 : HU ← HU ∪ {i}
4 : return pki
OCorr( · ) with ( · ) = ( i )
1 : if i ∈ HU then
2 : HU ← HU − {i}
3 : return ski from List
OTr( · ) with ( · ) = (m, Ψ, σ)
1 : return Trace(tsk, apk0, (m, Ψ, σ))
OAtt( · )
( · ) = (i,warri, a, {apkj |upkj})
1 : L := {a|(a, pka, ska) ∈ List}
2 : if i ∈ L ∧ j ∈ L then
3 : warr ← AttIssue(aski,
warri, a, {apkj |upkj})
4 : return warr
5 : return ⊥
OSig( · ) with ( · ) = (i,warr,m, Ψ)
1 : A← {a| a ∈ warr}
2 : if i ∈ HU ∧ Ψ(A) then
3 : σ ← Sign((uski,warr),m, Ψ)
4 : return σ
5 : return ⊥
Fig. 1. Oracles used in the HABS security experiments.
in List. The public key is removed from HU so the oracle keeps track of
corrupt entities.
– OAtt : A uses this oracle to ask an attribute authority to delegate attributes
to either an IA or to the user. In particular, the adversary has control over
which attributes are issued and the oracle outputs a warrant warr if both
parties are registered, otherwise it outputs ⊥.
– OSig : A can ask for a HABS signature from a registered user. The adversary
provides the warrant (and implicitly the attributes used), signing policy,
message and the public key of the signer. If the attribute set satisfies the
policy, and the public key is contained in HU then the signature will be
given to A, otherwise ⊥ is returned.
– OTr : sA can ask the TA trace a HABS signature (provided by the adversary)
to the output is returned. The TA does verification checks on the signature
and upon failure, will return ⊥.
Path Anonymity. This property extends the anonymity guarantees of tra-
ditional ABS schemes and hides not only the identity of the signer but also
the identities of all intermediate authorities on delegation paths for attributes
included into the signer’s warrant. Path anonymity, as defined in Fig. 2, also
ensures that signatures produced by the same signer remain unlinkable. The
corresponding experiment requires the adversary to distinguish which warrant
and private key were used in the generation of the challenge HABS signature
σb. In the first phase, A1 generates a hierarchy of authorities and users, utilising
the RA’s secret key ask0. If the warrants created by A1 are of the same size, a
challenge HABS signature σb is produced on the randomly chosen user-warrant
6
pair. In the second phase, with access to the tracing oracle, the adversary A2
must be able to guess the challenge bit b.
Definition 2 (Path Anonymity [12]) A HABS scheme offers path anonymity
if no PPT adversary adv can distinguish between Exppa-0HABS,A and Exp
pa-1
HABS,A
defined in Fig. 2, i.e., the following advantage is negligible in λ:
AdvpaHABS,A(λ) = |Pr[Exppa-0HABS,A(λ) = 1]− |Pr[Exppa-1HABS,A(λ) = 1]|.
Exppa-bHABS,A(λ)
1 : (pp, ask0, tsk)← Setup(1λ)
2 : (st, (usk0,warr0), (usk1,warr1),m, Ψ)← A1(pp, ask0 : OReg, OCorr, OTr)
3 : if |warr0| = |warr1| then
4 : σ0 ← Sign((usk0,warr0),m, Ψ), σ1 ← Sign((usk1,warr1),m, Ψ)
5 : if Verify(apk0, (m,Ψ, σ0)) = 1 and Verify(apk0, (m,Ψ, σ1)) = 1 then
6 : b′ ← A2(st, σb : OTr)
7 : return b′ ∧ A2 did not query OTr(tsk, (m,Ψ, σb))
8 : return 0
Fig. 2. Path-Anonymity Experiment
Non-frameability. This property, formalised in Fig. 3, captures the notion of
unforgeability, i.e., that no PPT adversary can create a HABS signature without
having an honestly issued warrant that satisfies the policy, and in particular, they
cannot create one on behalf of an user for which the secret key is not known.
The adversary wins if either he produces a valid HABS signature, or is able to
perform delegation for at least one attribute on behalf of any honest authority
anywhere in the delegation path.
Definition 3 (Non-Frameability [12]) A HABS scheme is non-frameable,
if no PPT adversary A can win the experiment ExpnfHABS,A defined in Fig. 3, i.e.,
the following advantage is negligible in λ:
AdvnfHABS,A(λ) = |Pr[ExpnfHABS,A(λ) = 1]|.
Path Traceability. This property, formalised in Fig. 4, ensures that any valid
HABS signature can be traced (by the tracing authority) to the signer and the
set of authorities that were involved in the issue of attributes used to produce
the signature. The adversary is required to output either a HABS signature that
verifies but cannot be traced, or one in which the tracing algorithm outputs a
warrant for which at least one IA or the user is unknown to the experiment, i.e.,
were not previously registered in List. The attribute-issuing oracle checks that
both entities are registered to prevent the trivial attack where adversary asks
the oracle to delegate to an unregistered entity.
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ExpnfHABS,A(λ)
1 : pp ← Setup(1λ), ask0 ← KGen(1λ), tsk ← TKGen(1λ)
2 : ((σ,m, Ψ), (upkj ,warr, pˆi))← A(pp, ask0, tsk : OAtt, OSig, OCorr, OReg)
3 : if Verify(apk0, (m, Ψ, σ)) ∧ Judge(tpk, apk0, (m, Ψ, σ), (upkj ,warr, pˆi)) then
4 : if j ∈ HU ∧ A did not query OSig((uskj ,warr),m, Ψ) then, return 1
5 : if ∃a. a ∈ warr =⇒ (apk0, apk1, . . . , apkn, upkj , ?) = warr[a] ∧
6 : ((∃i ∈ [0, n− 1]. A did not query OAtt(i, · , a, apki+1) ∧ i ∈ HU) ∨
7 : (A did not query OAtt(n, · , a, upkj) ∧ n ∈ HU) ) then, return 1
8 : return 0
Fig. 3. Non-Frameability Experiment
ExptrHABS,A(λ)
1 : pp ← Setup(1λ), ask0 ← KGen(1λ), tsk ← TKGen(1λ)
2 : ((σ,m, Ψ), (upk,warr, pˆi))← A(pp, tsk : OAtt, OCorr, OReg)
3 : if Verify(apk0, (m,Ψ, σ)) then
4 : if Trace(tsk, (m,Ψ, σ)) = ⊥ then, return 1
5 : if Judge(tpk, apk0, (m,Ψ, σ), (upk,warr, pˆi)) ∧
6 : (∃a. a ∈ warr =⇒ (apk0, apk1, . . . , apkn, upk, ?) = warr[a] ∧
7 : ( (∃i ∈ [0, n− 1]. i ∈ HU ∧ (i+ 1, apki+1, aski+1) /∈ List)∨
8 : (n ∈ HU ∧ ( · , upk, usk) /∈ List) ) ) then, return 1
9 : return 0
Fig. 4. Path-Traceability Experiment
Definition 4 (Path Traceability [12]) A HABS scheme offers path traceabil-
ity if no PPT adversary A can win the experiment ExptrHABS,A defined in Fig. 4,
i.e., the following advantage is negligible in λ:
AdvtrHABS,A(λ) = |Pr[ExptrHABS,A(λ) = 1]|.
3 Our Short HABS Construction
We start with the description of the underlying hardness assumptions and build-
ing blocks.
3.1 Underlying Hardness Assumptions
In addition to widely used hardness assumptions in the asymmetric bilinear
group setting generated by BG(1λ), namely q-Srong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) [7],
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Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) [1] and Simultaneous Decision LIN-
ear (SDLIN) [26] assumptions, which we do not recall here, our scheme requires
the following interactive assumption, which we prove to hold in the generic group
model [36, 24]. We equip the adversary with an oracle OX0,Y0 and assume that
it is hard to produce group elements that satisfy the verification equations for
an input that has not been queried to the oracle. We note that on input of
(X,Y ), the oracle can compute each component without knowledge the discrete
logarithm of X or Y as it has access to r, s, t1, t2.
Assumption 1 Let pp := (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)← BG(1λ). The adversary A
has access to the oracle OX0,Y0(·, ·) which on input (X,Y ) returns (A,B, T1, T2,
T3, T4) := (h
x0t1
2 h
x0t2
5 h
xt1
2 h
yt1
5 , h
y0t1
5 h
y0t2
4 h
xt2
5 h
yt2
4 , f
t1
1 , f
t2
2 , g
t1
2 , g
t2
2 ) for t1, t2 ←
Z∗p. We assume that for all p.p.t. adversaries A, the following probability is
negligible in λ.
Adv
Assump1
A (λ) :=
Pr

x0, y0, r, s← Z∗p;h1 := gs1, h2 := gs
2
1 , h3 := g
r
1, h4 := g
r2
1 , h5 := g
rs
1
f1 := g
s
2, f2 := g
r
2, X0 := h
x0
1 ;Y0 := h
y0
3 ;
(Aˆ, Bˆ, Tˆ1, Tˆ2, Tˆ3, Tˆ4, Xˆ, Yˆ )← AOX0,Y0 (pp,X0, Y0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, f1, f2) :
e(Aˆ, g2) = e(X0, Tˆ1Tˆ2)e(XˆYˆ , Tˆ1) ∧ e(Bˆ, g2) = e(Y0, Tˆ1Tˆ2)e(XˆYˆ , Tˆ2)
∧ e(g1, Tˆ1Tˆ2) = e(h1, Tˆ3)e(h3, Tˆ4) where (Xˆ, Yˆ ) was not queried.

Theorem 1. Let A denote an adversary in the generic group model against
Assumption 1. A has access to oracles for which he makes qG group queries, qP
pairing queries, and qO oracle queries. The probability  of A winning the game
for Assumption 1 is bounded by  ≤ 5(qG + qP + 6qO + 11)2/p, where p is the
prime order of the generic groups.
Proof. See full version [19].
3.2 Cryptographic Building Blocks
The following building blocks will be used in our HABS construction.
Tag-based Encryption. A TBE scheme has the same algorithms as a tradi-
tional public key encryption scheme, except that its encryption and decryption
procedures take an extra tag t as input. A correctly formed TBE ciphertext C will
fail to decrypt if the tag used as input to the decryption algorithm is different
from the one used upon encryption. We adopt the TBE scheme from [26] which
relies on the SDLIN assumption. It offers selective-tag witness-indistinguishable
chosen-ciphertext (st-IND-CCA) security, where an adversary is unable to dis-
tinguish between two ciphertexts under the same tag t of their choosing. Kiltz
[28] showed that a st-IND-CCA TBE scheme combined with a strongly unforge-
able one-time signature, where the one-time verification key is used as the tag,
gives rise to an IND-CCA2 secure PKE. Our scheme uses this approach.
One-Time Signature. For the OTS, we use the strongly unforgeable BBS one-
time signature scheme from [7]. It consist of three algorithms (KeyGen, Sig, Ver)
with a verification key in G2 × Z∗p and the corresponding signing key in Z∗2p .
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Groth-Sahai Proofs. We use the Groth-Sahai proof system [22] to construct
the required non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs NIZK. A GS proof, which
consists of five algorithms (Setup, Prove, Verify, SimSetup, SimProve), allows
proving relations involving multi-linear, quadratic, and pairing-based equations.
We use GS proofs in the asymmetric bilinear group setting with Type-3 curves
[18], i.e., where there is no computable isomorphism between G1 and G2, in
which case their security is based on the SXDH assumption [7].
Homomorphic Trapdoor Commitments to Group Elements. The key
to our short HABS scheme is the length-reducing homomorphic trapdoor com-
mitment scheme by Groth [21], adopted in our new delegation mechanism. With
the HTC scheme, defined by four algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Commit, Trapdoor),
one can use the trapdoor key tk to open a constant-length commitment (c, d)
to arbitrary group elements with respect to a commitment key. We observe that
due to its construction this HTC scheme has an interesting property that allows
a commitment to group elements step-wise, i.e. an opening (ai, bi) to elements
g1, . . . , gi can be transformed into an opening (ai+1, bi+1) for an extended set of
elements g1, . . . , gi+1 without knowledge of the secret commitment key, i.e., with-
out jeopardising the binding property for the already committed group elements.
In our HABS scheme such step-wise extension of an initial commitment (c, d)
produced by the root authority allows intermediate authorities, upon delegation,
to embed public keys of next-level authorities or users, along with the delegated
attribute, by providing appropriate modification to the opening of (c, d), that
is without changing its value nor increasing its length. Proving ownership of a
delegated attribute amounts to presenting an opening (a, b) for the commitment
(c, d) to the attribute and the list of public keys of authorities on the delega-
tion path, i.e., apk0, . . . ,upk, ?. In our scheme we use the asymmetric variant of
Groth’s HTC scheme with security based on the XDLIN assumption [1].
3.3 Specification of our HABS Scheme
We start with a high-level intuition behind our HABS construction and provide
detailed specification in Figures 5, 6, and 7.
High-Level Overview. As part of the setup process public parameters pp of
the scheme are generated. They include the security parameter λ, the descrip-
tion of bilinear groups (G1,G2,GT ), the trapdoor key tk for the HTC scheme, the
initial ’dummy’ HTC commitment (c, d) with an opening (a0, b0), and the descrip-
tion of the attribute universe A. The independent tracing authority TA generates
the TBE key-pair (tsk,tpk):=((η1, η2), (V1, V2, V3, V4)) with tpk included into pp.
For simplicity we describe the setup phase as a single process involving com-
putations performed by the RA and TA. We stress, however, that generation
of h1, ..., h5, f1, f2 must be trusted in that no entity knows the corresponding
exponents.
In our scheme, all attribute authorities and users generate their own pri-
vate/public key pairs (aski,apki) and (usk, upk) respectively, of the form {(x, y),
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Setup(λ)
0 : (G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, e, p)← BG(1λ)
1 : Sample r, s← Z∗p
2 : h1 := g
s
1, h2 := g
s2
1 , h3 := g
r
1 ,
h4 := g
r2
1 , h5 := g
rs
1
3 : f1 := g
s
2, f2 := g
r
2
4 : Define H1 : A→ Z∗p,
H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p,H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p
5 : Sample g˜1 ← G1, g˜2 ← G2
6 : Compute ζ ← e(g˜1, g˜2)
7 : (tsk, tpk)← TKGen
8 : w1 ← NIZK1.Setup
9 : w2 ← NIZK2.Setup
10 : Define attribute universe A
11 : Sample mr,ms, nr, ns ← Z∗p
12 : Sample a0, b0 ← G1
13 : Compute gr ← gmr2 , gs ← gms2 ,
hr ← gnr2 , hs ← gns2
14 : Compute c := e(a0, gr)e(b0, gs)
d := e(a0, hr)e(b0, hs)
15 : Compute ∆ := mrns − nrms
16 : α := ns/∆, β := −ms/∆,
γ := −nr/∆, δ := mr/∆
17 : tk := (mr,ms, nr, ns, α, β, γ, δ)
18 : pp := (G, c, d, a0, b0, tk,H1,H2,
H3, ζ, g˜1, g˜2, tpk,A, w1, w2)
for G := (G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, e, p
h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, f1, f2)
19 : return pp
Fig. 5. Setup algorithm of our HABS construction.
(X,Y, Z, Zˆ)}. While only X and Y are used in the verification of attribute del-
egation which we prove in the signature, the components (Z, Zˆ) are used in the
issuing phase. To ensure an authority creates a delegation that opens to (X,Y ),
we insist that the validity of a public key is checked prior to delegation. This
is done by evaluating e(XY, h1) = e(Z, g2) and e(XY, h3) = e(Zˆ, g2). IAs and
users obtain attributes from existing authorities at a higher level in the hier-
archy. Ownership of a valid key-pair (aski, apki) allows authorities to delegate
attributes further down the hierarchy and to the users, by manipulating the
opening of the initial commitment (c, d).
With the trapdoor key tk an authority can create an opening (ai, bi) for (c, d)
to the path that includes delegate’s public key e.g. apkj . Rather than opening di-
rectly, the issuer first creates randomisation tokens T1, T2, T3, T4 ∈ G2 and opens
to these instead. It then uses T1 and T2 as one-time commitment keys to open
to apkj and the delegated attribute att, that is hashed into the message space
using gH1(att). The randomisation tokens T1 and T2 are used to prevent forg-
eries (where the adversary combines multiple openings and in doing so, forges
an opening to a new public key) whereas T3 and T4 are used to verify the well-
formedness of T1 and T2, by evaluating e(g1, T1T2) = e(h1, T4)e(h3, T3). The
issuing authority updates the (possibly empty) warrant with opening (ai, bi),
his public key apki and the randomisation tokens (T1, T2, T3, T4). As tk is part
of public parameters, any IA in the hierarchy is able to perform the delegation
procedure, where it receives (ai−1, bi−1) from its issue and generates (ai, bi) for
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KGen(pp)
0 : Sample x, y ← Z∗p
1 : X := hx1 , Y := h
y
3 ,
2 : Z := hx2h
y
5 , Zˆ := h
x
5h
y
4
3 : pk := (X,Y, Z, Zˆ),
4 : sk := (pk, x, y)
5 : return (pk, sk)
TKGen(pp)
0 : Sample η1, η2 ← Z∗p
1 : Compute V1 := g
η1
1 , V2 := g
η2
1
2 : Sample V3, V4 ← G2
3 : tpk := (V1, V2, V3, V4)
4 : tsk := (tpk, η1, η2)
5 : return (tsk, tpk)
AttIssue(aski, {apkj |upk}, att, ai, bi,warr)
0 : Parse {apkj |upk} as (Xj , Yj , Zj , Zˆj)
1 : Verify e(XY, h1) = e(Z, g2)
and e(XY, h3) = e(Zˆ, g2)
2 : Sample t1, t2 ← Z∗p
3 : T1 := f
t1
1 , T2 := f
t2
2 , T3 := g
t1
2 , T4 := g
t2
2
4 : a˜← amri bmsi (ht12 ht25 )−xi(ZjhH1(att)1 )−t1
b˜← anri bnsi (ht15 ht24 )−yi(ZˆjhH1(att)3 )−t2
5 : (ai+1, bi+1) := (a˜
αb˜β , a˜γ b˜δ)
6 : warr = warr ∪ {apki, T1, T2}
7 : return (ai+1, bi+1,warr)
Fig. 6. Key generation and issue of attributes in our HABS construction.
the next delegation. When delegating to users, an issuing IA will open (c, d) to
a designated element ? ∈ G, in addition to the user’s public key upk and the
attribute att. A warrant contains the trapdoor opening and a list of all public
keys of AAs that appear in the delegation path for any issued attribute.
Upon signing, the user first generates an OTS key-pair (otssk, otsvk) :=
{(k1, k2), (K1,K2, κ)} and an opening to H3(otsvk) by modifying the open-
ing (a0, b0) using his public key upk and the trapdoor key tk. The reduced
warr along with upk are encrypted in a TBE ciphertext under the TA’s pub-
lic key tpk and tag H3(otsvk). The signing policy Ψ is modelled as a mono-
tone span program, with labelling function ρ that maps rows from S to the
attribute set A. The signer proves that this set satisfies Ψ by computing a vector
z such that zS = [1, 0, ..., 0], where any non-zero entry zi implies ρ(i) ∈ warr.
A NIZK proof pi is then computed using Groth-Sahai framework with witness
(upk,warr, z, r˜, s˜) for the following relation:
(
(a, b),warr, upk, z
)
,
(
Ψ, otsvk, apk0, C, tpk
)
: zS = [1, 0, ..., 0]
∧ (∀i. zi 6= 0 =⇒ atti = ρ(i) ∧ (apki1 , ..., apkin , apkin+1 := upk) ∈ C
∧ c|warr|+1 = e(a, gr)e(b, gs)e(X, gH3(otsvk)2 )
ΠiΠ
k
n=0e(Xin , T1,inT2,in)e(Xin+1Yin+1g
H1(att)
1 , T1,in)
∧ d|warr|+1 = e(a, hr)e(b, hs)e(Y, gH3(otsvk)2 )
ΠiΠ
k
n=0e(Yin , T1,inT2,in)e(Xin+1Yin+1g
H1(att)
1 , T2,in)
∧ e(g1, ΠiΠkn=0T1,inT2,in) = e(h1, ΠiΠnn=0T4,in)e(h3, ΠiΠkn=0T3,in).
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Sign(usk,m, Ψ, {attj , aj , bj ,warrj}j∈J)
0 : (k1, k2, k3)← Z∗p
1 : otsvk := (g˜k12 , g˜
k2
2 , k3)
2 : Compute z s.t. zS = [1, 0, ..., 0]
3 : T1 := f
t1
1 , T2 := f
t2
2 ,
T3 := g
t1
2 , T4 := g
t2
2
4 : a′ ← amri bmsi (ht12 ht25 )−xh−t1H3(otsvk)1
b′ ← anri bnsi (ht15 ht24 )−yh−t2H3(otsvk)3
5 : (a′, b′) := (a˜αb˜β , a˜γ b˜δ)
6 : (a, b) = (a′ ·Πaj , b′ ·Πbj)
7 : C ← TBE.Enc(tpk,warr, upk,
a, b, {H1(otsvk)})
8 : pi ← NIZK1.Prove((upk, z,warr, a, b) :
(C, otsvk, tpk, apk0, Ψ) ∈ R)
9 : H ← H2(pi||C||Ψ ||m||otsvk)
10 : σo ← g˜1/(k1+H+k2k3)1
11 : return (σo, C, pi, otsvk)
Verify(pk, σ,m, Ψ)
0 : Parse σ as (ots, pi, otsvk)
1 : H ← H2(pi||C||Ψ ||m||otsvk)
2 : return NIZK.Verify(pi)
∧ e(σo, g˜k12 · g˜H2 · g˜k2k32 ) = ζ
Trace(tsk, σ,m, Ψ)
0 : if Verify(σ,m, Ψ) = 1 then
1 : warr← TBE.Dec(tsk, C, t)
for t = H1(otsvk)
2 : pˆi ← NIZK2.Prove(tsk :
(otsvk, C, tpk, (apk0,warr)))
3 : return (warr, pˆi)
Judge(tpk,warr, σ)
0 : Verify(ask0, (σ,m, Ψ))
∧ NIZK2.Verify(pi2)
Fig. 7. Sign, Verify, Trace and Judge algorithms of our HABS construction.
The message m and policy Ψ are then bound to this proof and ciphertext
by hashing H2(pi,C, Ψ,m), before an OTS signature σo is produced with otssk.
The resulting signature is verified with respect to the public parameters of the
scheme, and the RA’s public key apk0 by verifying the OTS signature and the
NIZK proof.
As part of the tracing procedure, executed by TA with knowledge of tsk, the
ciphertext C is decrypted to obtain the warrant warr, signer’s public key upk,
and the opening (a, b). A publicly verifiable NIZK proof pˆi is created with witness
tsk for the statement (otsvk,C,tpk,(apk0,warr)) and relation:
TBE.Dec(tsk, C,H3(otsvk)) = (upk,warr, a, b).
We give a detailed construction for the Groth-Sahai proofs NIZK1 and NIZK2 in
Appendix D.
3.4 Security Analysis
In this section we prove that our construction meets HABS security properties
of path anonymity, non-frameability and path traceability.
Lemma 1 The HABS construction from Fig. 5, 6 and 7 offers path anonymity,
if SXDH, SDLIN and q-SDH hold in G.
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Proof. We follow a game-based approach and show that the advantage of the
PPT adversary A in the path-anonymity experiment for the HABS construction
from Fig.5, 6 and 7, is bounded by the advantages of the constructed adver-
saries for the underlying primitives. We assume that adversary A asks n user
registration queries and the probability for sampling one of these users is 1/n.
Game G0: This game is defined to the be the experiment Exp
pa-b
HABS,A(λ) in Fig.
2, where the 2-stage adversary A = (A1,A2) is required to distinguish between
the HABS signatures σ0 = (σ
0
o ,C0, pi0, otsvk0) and σ1 = (σ
1
o ,C1, pi1, otsvk1).
Game G1: We define the game G1 as G0 where the check “A2 did not query
OTr(m,Ψ, σb)” is enforced by the OTr oracle available to A2, which aborts the
game if this is the case. The probability from G0 to G1 is preserved.
Game G2: The game G2 is obtained from G1 where, on the output of OTr,
we replace the NIZK2 proof pˆi with pˆi
′ from the simulator NIZK2.SimProve. We
also replace Setup by SimSetup for NIZK2. This prevents the case where A may
”extract” tsk from NIZK2 proofs. Thus, for all future OTr oracle calls we use the
simulated NIZK2 proof. The probability that A can distinguish between these
two games is bounded by the advantage of the zero-knowledge adversary Bnizk2
for NIZK2. For our instantiation of GS proofs, this is reduced to the SXDH
assumption [22].
Game G3: Let G3 be the game obtained from G2 where we replace the proof pib
from the challenge signature σb = (σo,b, Cb, pib, otsvkb) with the simulated proof
pi′b by calling NIZK1.Sim on (Cb, otsvkb, tpk, apk0, Ψ). Additionally, we replace
NIZK1.Setup by NIZK1.SimSetup. The probability thatA can distinguish between
games G2 and G3 is bounded by the advantage of the zero-knowledge adversary
Bnizk1 for NIZK1 proof. Similarly, this property is implied by SXDH.
Game G4: Game G4 only differs from game G3 in that we abort if A2 queries
OTr(m,Ψ, (σo,Cb, pi, otsvkb)). The adversary A is only able to distinguish be-
tween these games if it can produce a valid OTS signature σo for the message
(Cb, pi,m, Ψ) and public key otsvkb, without knowledge of the secret key otsskb.
Thus, the capabilities of the adversary A to distinguish between these two games
is bounded by the advantage of the adversary Bots against the strong unforge-
ability of the OTS scheme, which is reduced to the q-SDH assumption [7].
Game G5: Game G5 is defined to be G4, except we additionally do a check for
any queries A2 makes do not contain the challenge ciphertext, that is OTr(m,Ψ,
(σo,Cb, pi, otsvk)). If so the game is aborted. The output of OTr is for G4 and
G5 is the same, as the oracle returns ⊥ if the tag otsvkb for C is different from
otsvk received as input. Hence, the probability is preserved.
Game G6: The game G6 is the same as G5, except that we move the OTS key
generation from the signature generation phase into the setup of the experiment.
Note that only one key pair needs to be created in this game since the adversary
only sees the challenge signature. This step is necessary to utilise the st-IND-
CCA property of the TBE scheme. The probability is unchanged from game G5
to G6.
Game G7: Let G7 be the game obtained from G6 where the TBE ciphertext
Cb from the challenge signature σb = (σ
b
o, Cb, pi
′
b, otsvkb) is replaced with the
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C0. The adversary A is unable to query a ciphertext C ′ 6= Cb for the same tag
H3(otsvk) as a result of game G4. Further, any query to the oracle for a tag
t′ 6= H3(otsvk) will also fail as decryption of Cb is dependent on the correct tag.
Thus, the ability of the adversary A2 to distinguish between the ciphertexts C0
and Cb is bounded by the advantage of the st-IND-CCA adversary Bind. For out
instantiation, this property of TBE is implied by SDLIN [26].
The experiment G7 provides A with the same challenge signature indepen-
dent of b that A is asked to guess. Additionally, due to the zero-knowledge
property of NIZK2 used in G1, A does not have access to tsk. Therefore, the
probability that the adversary wins game G7 is 1/2 and hence the advantage of
A to win this experiment is 0. 
Lemma 2 The HABS construction from Fig. 5, 6 and 7 is non-frameable, if
H1,H2 and H3 are second-preimage resistant hash functions, and q-SDH, SXDH
and Assumption 1 hold in G.
Proof. We begin by first splitting the non-frameability experiment from Fig. 3
into two experiments based on the winning condition of the adversary A. The
first Exp1, defined in Fig. 8, captures the probability of the adversary A to cre-
ate a forged HABS signature. The second experiment Exp2 is the same as Exp1
except that the event ”j ∈ HU ∧ A did not query OSig((uskj ,warr), Ψ,m)” is
replaced with
“∃a. a ∈ warr =⇒ (apk0, apk1, . . . , apkn, upkj , ?) = warr[a] ∧
( (∃0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. A did not call OAtt(i, · , a, apki+1) ∧ i ∈ HU) ∨
(A did not call OAtt(n, · , a, upku) ∧ n ∈ HU))”
We capture the probability of winning the non-frameability experiment by
the probability that A wins either Exp1 or Exp2.
Exp1 - The Exp
nf
HABS,A(λ) where A did not query OSig((usk,warr), Ψ,m)
1 : (pp,ask0, tsk)← Setup(1λ)
2 : ((m,Ψ, σ), (upkj ,warr, ( ˆpi, σs)))← A(pp, ask0, tsk : OAtt, OSig, OCorr, OReg)
3 : (σo,C, pi, otsvk) = σ
4 : if NIZK1.Verify((C, otsvk, tpk, apk0, Ψ), pi) ∧
5 : OTS.Verify(otsvk, (m,Ψ,C, pi), σo) ∧
6 : NIZK2.Verify(tpk, (otsvk,C, upkj ,warr, σs), pˆi)∧
7 : j ∈ HU ∧
8 : A did not query OSig((uskj ,warr), Ψ,m) then
9 : return 1
10 : return 0
Fig. 8. Experiment Exp1
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We first bound the advantage of the adversary for the experiment Exp1.
Intuitively, we consider the output of the adversary and argue that each compo-
nent must coincide with a call to the signing oracle. The forgery is denoted by
(upk′,warr′, m′, Ψ ′), (σ′o,C
′, pi′, otsvk′). We take each element of the tuple (upkj ,
warr, m, Ψ) and try to reason about its relation with their prime counterpart.
Given n calls to the registration oracle, we model the probability the adver-
sary can guess which oracle constructs the keys for a particular user uniformly,
i.e. is equal to 1/n.
Game G0. This game is defined as Exp1 where the query restriction ”A did
not query OSig((uskj , warr),m, Ψ)” in instead enforced by a membership check
(upku,warr,m, Ψ) /∈ SigL for the list SigL. We also introduce the list SigLO
that stores the input and output of the OSig oracle. Both lists are initialised
empty at the beginning of the experiment, and are updated with the inputs,
and additionally, the outputs of the OSig oracle, respectively. The probability is
preserved between Exp1 and G0.
Game G1. This game is defined exactly asG0 with the exception of an additional
check that the opening (a, b) for (c, d) contains the path e(Xi, g
H3(otsvk)) and
e(Yi, g
H3(otsvk)), respectively. The success probability of a soundness adversary
for NIZK1 bounds the distinguishability of G1 from G0. That is, A can only
distinguish between these two games if it is able to generate a valid NIZK1 proof
for a false statement, namely that (a, b) does not open to gH3(otsvk). Soundness
for our instantiation of NIZK1 is implied by the SXDH assumption [22].
Game G2. The game G2 is obtained from G1 by adding the condition (upkj , ?, ?,
?) /∈ SigL. The adversary in G2 managed to create a valid opening (a, b) for upku
to gH3(otsvk), without having access to the user’s secret key uskj (since j ∈ HU).
The capabilities of A in this experiment are upper-bounded by the advantage of
an adversary against Assumption 1 and the second-preimage property of H3.
Game G3. Game G3 is defined to be Game G1, but where A made at least
one signing query that contains user upkj . Therefore, there exists ((upkj ,warr
′,
m′, Ψ ′), (σ′o,C
′, pi′, otsvk′)) ∈ SigL with (warr,m, Ψ) 6= (warr′,m′, Ψ ′) as (upkj ,
warr,m, Ψ) /∈ SigL but (upkj ,warr′,m′, Ψ ′) ∈ SigL. The probability is pre-
served between G1 and G3.
Game G4. We define G4 as the game G3 where otsvk 6= otsvk′. In this case, the
adversary A is able to provide a forged opening to gH(otsvk′) without knowledge
of uskj . This is similar to the method of computing the bound for G2, except
that now A asks signature queries for upk. It is also bounded by an adversary
against Assumption 1.
Game G5. We define game G5 as the game G3 where (m,Ψ) 6= (m′, Ψ ′). At
this point, we have otsvk = otsvk′ and upk = upkj for some j. Thus, if A can
distinguish between G5 and G3 then it is able to provide a forgery for the OTS
scheme by signing a message that contains (m′, Ψ ′) without knowledge of otssk,
or break the second preimage property of H2.
Game G6. We define game G6 as the game G5 where (m,Ψ) = (m
′, Ψ ′). Because
of the (warr,m, Ψ) 6= (warr′,m′, Ψ ′) restriction, we have warr′ 6= warr. The
correctness property of the encryption scheme TBE that builds C′ now implies
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C 6= C′ under the tag t = H3(otsvk). The probability that the adversary can
distinguish between G6 and G5 is upper-bounded by an adversary B′cor against
the correctness of TBE, which is implied by the SDLIN assumption [26].
Game G7. Let G7 is the same as G6 but with C 6= C′. Assuming second-
preimage resistance of H2, the adversary A managed to create a forged OTS
signature without knowledge of otssk. Therefore, the probability of success for
adversary A in this game is bounded by the advantage of an OTS-forger B′ots.
The q-SDH assumption implies the BBS signature is strongly unforgeable [7].
From the sequence of games G0, . . . , G7, it follows that the probability of
Exp1 is bounded by the unforgeability of OTS, zero-knowledge of NIZK1, correct-
ness of TBE, and computational hardness of Assumption 1.
The experiment Exp2 captures the case where the adversary A is able to
provide a forged delegation for an honest authority apki and some attribute att.
In this case, A is bounded by the hardness of Assumption 1 and the second
preimage property of H1.
Lemma 3 The HABS construction from Fig. 5, 6 and 7 offers path traceability,
if SXDH, SDLIN and Assumption 1 hold in G.
Proof. See full version [19].
Theorem 2. The HABS scheme in Figs. 5, 6 and 7 offers path-anonymity, non-
frameability and path-traceability if H1,H2 and H3 are second-preimage resistant
hash functions and SXDH, SDLIN, q-SDH and Assumption 1 hold in G.
Proof. The result follows from Lemmas 1, 2 and 3. 
4 Efficiency Comparison
We first compare the warrant sizes for our scheme and [12]. For a single at-
tribute, an authority at level 1 (with respect to the root authority at level 0) has
a warrant size of 6 group elements (of the form G21 ×G42). Further delegation to
level 2 adds a further 6 elements in G21×G42. A delegation from the root author-
ity contains the opening (a, b) (as part of the 6 elements) which is updated by
subsequent delegations, however the warrant must now also contain the issuers
public key (Xi, Yi) in G21. This generalises, and for a user at level k, the size of
the warrant is 6k for a single attribute. Likewise, if we extend the number of
attributes in the warrant to |A|, each of which has a delegation path of length
k, then the warrant has 6k|A| group elements.
In contrast, for a single attribute issued to a level-1 entity, the warrant in [12]
contains 7d 12+2mm−2 e group elements, where m is the size of the message space used
in the TBS instantiation. A level-2 delegation increases this to 7d 24+4mm−2 e+2m+12
elements, and this generalises for a single attribute that is issued to a level k
entity to 7dk(12+2m)m−2 e+(k−1)(2m+12) elements. Similarly, a warrant that con-
tains |A| attributes adds a linear factor of |A| to this term. To give a concrete
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comparison, a user with 3 attributes at level 4 of the hierarchy would have a war-
rant containing 72 group elements in our scheme, as opposed to 208 elements for
an optimal choice of m (i.e., m = 10) in the scheme from [12]. Since m would be
chosen in advance during the setup phase, the warrant would unlikely reach its
optimal bound and for any suboptimal choice of m, the warrant grows linearly
in this parameter.
Next, in Table 1 we compare the sizes of public keys (of users and authori-
ties) and the lengths of signatures generated by our scheme and [12]. By β we
denote the size of the span program representing the policy Ψ . As before k is the
maximum length of a delegation path, |Ψ | is the number of attributes needed to
satisfy the signing policy, and m is the size of the message space for the TBS
scheme used in [12].
Dragan et al. [12] This Work
G Zp G1 G2 Zp
Public Keys
upk 14 - 4 - -
apk 12+2m - 4 - -
Sig.
ots 3 1 2 1 1
C
5(6+m)k(k−1)|Ψ|
(m−2) + 110 - 6(2k − 1)|Ψ |+ 12 4(2k − 1)|Ψ |+ 8 -
pi
28(6+m)k(k−1)|Ψ|
(m−2) + 18 2β 8 2k|Ψ |+ 8 β
Table 1. Comparison of key and signature sizes.
In addition to being more efficient and shorter than [12], our scheme, in
fact, produces HABS signatures of optimal length, from the asymptotic point
of view. The need to provide path traceability, where the TA must be able to
reveal the entire delegation path along with delegated attributes from a valid
HABS signature implies the O(k|Ψ |) growth of its length. This means that in
order to reduce this bound path-tracability property would need to be relaxed.
Finally, our scheme brings a few other efficiency improvements. The use of
Type-3 pairings results in fewer group elements and the possibility to achieve
the same level security for a smaller choice of the prime p [18], which would give
rise to smaller groups and faster operations than in the symmetric setting. In
addition, we can adopt batch verification techniques available for Groth-Sahai
proofs [6] to speed up the computations.
5 Conclusion
We proposed a direct construction of Hierarchical Attribute-based Signatures
(HABS) with a new delegation process based on length-reducing homomorphic
trapdoor commitments. Our HABS scheme significantly reduces the lengths of
warrants, public keys and signatures in comparison to the so-far only known
(generic) HABS construction. Moreover, due to the need to support the path-
traceability requirement, our HABS scheme achieves optimal signature length
growth of O(k|Ψ |) for delegations paths of size k and signing policies of size |Ψ |.
Our technique of step-wise embedding of new group elements into the homo-
morphic trapdoor commitment can be considered to be of independent interest,
e.g., it could add support for delegation to other privacy-preserving signature
schemes that rely on homomorphic trapdoor commitments, e.g. [2].
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